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1. INTRODUCTION
On May 8, 1986, the House of Lords denied the Coca-Cola Com-
pany (Coke) trademark protection for the shape and design of the bottle
Coke had been using in England for almost eighty years.' The House
of Lords denied protection despite: (1) convincing evidence that the
public associated the shape of the bottle with Coke's beverage,2 (2) a
finding that the bottle had a distinctive shape,' and (3) the fact that the
bottle was "used . . .in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating
* . .a connection . . . between the goods and some person having the
right . . . to use the mark," as required by the British trademark
statute.
Denying protection to Coke's "container" 5 has at least three nega-
tive implications. First, it will encourage others to enter the soft-drink
market and profit from Coke's acceptance and good-will. Second, it will
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 1985,
Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania.
Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695, 699, [1986] 2 All E.R.
274, 277 (H.L.). The appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeal, Re Coca-Cola
Co.'s Trade Marks Application, 1985 Fleet Street Pat. L. Rep. 315 [hereinafter
F.S.R.], 1986 R.P.C. 421 (C.A. 1985) upholding a decision of the trial court, Coca-
Cola Trade Marks (Q.B. Ch. Div. Dec. 14, 1983) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases
file). The trial court upheld denial of the registration by the Registrar of Trademarks.
Since the House of Lords opinion is rather cursory, reference is often made to either of
the two lower court decisions for greater detail.
The citation for the Court of Appeal case is to the Fleet Street Patent Law Re-
porter. The use of this reporter began in the late 1960s as a supplement to and partial
replacement for Reports of Patent Cases (R.P.C.). It is less available in the United
States than the Reports of Patent Cases, and now contains some cases not reported in
either the R.P.C. or the All E.R. More information regarding the introduction of the
Reporter can be obtained from Mead Data Central Co., 9393 Springboro Pike, P.O.
Box 933, Dayton, Ohio 45401, 1-800-543-6862.
2 Re Coca-Cola Co.'s Trade Marks Application, 1985 F.S.R. at 317, 1986 R.P.C.
at_ .
3 Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 697, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 275.
4 Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 68.
1 See generally Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 698, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 276 (where
Lord Templeman not only characterizes the item as a "container," instead of a mark,
but uses that characterization as one of the bases for denying Coke trademark
protection).
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confuse consumers, many of whom buy such items impulsively6 without
investigating the source of the product. Third, by denying trademark
protection to Coke's bottle, Britain's treatment of distinctive containers
(or "product configurations")' for liquid goods is completely opposite
from that of the United States. 9 This is incongruous because both the
United States and British trademark laws are virtually identical.10
Moreover, the United States has developed a way to grant protection to
such containers without causing confusion in the marketplace.1"
I See P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS, PLANNING, AND CON-
TROL 143-46 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing types of buying behavior and the degree of
buyer involvement associated with each); Schuman, Trademark Protection of
Container and Package Configurations - A Primer, 59 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 779,
779-80 (1983).
7 Zelnick, The Doctrine of "Functionality", 73 TRADEMARK REP. 128, 128
(1983).
' The term "product configuration" is used instead of "container," "package de-
sign," "product shape," or "product design," because product configuration has a
meaning which is broader in scope. Product configuration refers to all elements of a
product or its packaging that may set the item apart and thus serve as a trademark.
Moreover, many articles and cases on functionality now refer to product or container
design as product configuration. See, e.g., Duft, "Aesthetic" Functionality, 73 TRADE-
MARK REs'. 151 (1983) (discussing product configuration in relation to both utilitarian
and aesthetic functionality); Schuman, supra note 6; Spratling, The Protectability of
Package, Container, and Product Configurations, 63 TRADEMARK REP. 117 (1973)
(discussing the continued use of state unfair competition protection in the wake of two
principal United States Supreme Court decisions that held that state law cannot be
used to protect a configuration not protected by federal trademark or patent law).
I See, e.g., Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers' Co., 100 F. 809 (7th Cir. 1900)
(granting protection to the widely-recognized bottle in which Hires had sold its soft
drink for four years in a pre-Lanham Act case brought as an unfair competition viola-
tion); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. George W. Button Corp., 50 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (granting protection to a distinctively-shaped, widely-recognized clear glass bottle
for a popular perfume also in a pre-Lanham Act case brought as an unfair competition
violation); In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board 1977) [hereinafter T.T.A.B.] (granting protection for a config-
uration for liquid drain opener shaped like a sink drain); Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd.,
118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Dec. Comm'r Pat. 1958) (granting protection to the distinc-
tive bottle shapes used for the Scotch whisky known as "Pinch"); Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO), Trademark Reg. No. 696,147 (approved Aug. 12, 1960) (allowing
Coke to trademark in the United States the identical bottle for which trademark protec-
tion was denied in Britain).
10 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982) ("Any registration. . . owned by a party to
an action . . . shall be prima facie evidence of registrant's exclusive right to use the
registered mark. . . .") and 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982) ("trademark includes any word,
name, symbol or device. . . used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify and distin-
guish his goods . . . from those . . . sold by others . . . .") with Trade Marks Act,
1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 4 ("registration . . . of a person in Part A . . . as
proprietor of a trade mark . shall . . . [give] to that person the exclusive right to the
use of the trade mark . . . ") and id. § 68 (" 'trade mark' means . . . a mark used
• . . in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating . . . a connection . . . between
the goods and some person having the right . . . to use the mark . . ... "). See also
infra text accompanying notes 138-42 & 161-68.
" See infra text accompanying notes 56-73.
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This Comment analyzes the United States experience in this area
of trademark law, looking particularly at the rationale used to protect
distinctive product configurations with trademark rights. An analysis of
the British experience then follows, concluding with an examination of
the Coca-Cola decision itself. The United States and British approaches
are then compared, examining the assertions that the United States
treatment is (1) more consistent with the purposes of trademark protec-
tion, (2) less likely to confuse consumers regarding similar products,
and (3) more likely to reward those who successfully market products
with protection for their recognized configurations.
2. UNITED STATES TRADEMARK PROTECTION
2.1. Statutory Protection
2.1.1. General Concepts
One of the fundamental objectives of United States economic regu-
latory law is the promotion of free and fair competition.12 Trademark
law furthers this objective by first, encouraging merchants to differenti-
ate their products with marks or configurations and second, assuring
them that such marks will be protected from infringement by compet-
ing merchants. Thus, most products and services in the United States
are differentiated by either marks on the item (or its packaging) con-
sistently used in conjunction with the item, or by different designs of
the same item." One of the most important functions of such marks is
to encourage the production of quality products on a consistent basis. 4
Trademarks facilitate this because "they fix responsibility. Without
marks, a merchant's mistakes or low quality products would be un-
traceable to their source. Therefore, trademarks create an incentive to
keep up a good reputation."1
12 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1.1, at 2
(2d ed. 1984); 1 PINNER'S WORLD UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
U.S.A., Survey (H. Dawid ed. 1978) [hereinafter 1 PINNER'S].
13 See Schuman, supra note 6, at 780.
14 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2.1, at 45-46.
lB Id. As long as consumers can link a particular quality level with a particular
brand, providers of goods and services will have an incentive to increase (or maintain)
that quality. In contrast, if there were no marks or other devices that enabled product
differentiation, providers would have little or no incentive to improve (or maintain) a
certain level of quality. Market share would shift to those who provided equivalent
goods at the lowest price, regardless of quality. To recoup market share, producers
would lower prices by abandoning efforts to maintain quality, leading to an overall
decrease in quality.
In a predominantly competitive economy, it is unlikely that an absence of differen-
tiating marks would persist. Rather, it is likely that competitive innovation would even-
tually lead to the creation of marks, much the same as Adam Smith thought "the invisi-
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Another important function of such marks or product configura-
tions is the reduction of information-gathering costs for the consumer."x
This reduction occurs when the consumer can associate certain levels of
quality and product performance with certain product configurations.
Essentially, the configuration becomes "a basis for choice." 17 The risk
of variations in quality is reduced if the consumer can associate a par-
ticular product configuration with a particular product.
The major sources of product configuration protection in the
United States are unfair competition law and trademark law." Unfair
competition is a much broader concept than trademark law, since "eve-
rything that is likely to have an impact on the purchaser is relevant to
the ultimate determination of whether there is probable 'unfairness' [by
the merchant] or confusion by the purchaser."19 While trademark law
is thus generally considered a separate doctrine within unfair competi-
tion law,20 it is important to note:
[t]here is . . . a fundamental distinction to be drawn be-
tween trade-mark infringement and unfair competition
... . The essential element of a trade-mark is the exclusive
right of its owner to use a word or device to distinguish his
product. On the other hand, a claim of unfair competition
considers the total physical image given by the product and
its name together.21
ble hand" would lead to product differentiation through natural competition. See id. §
3.2, at 107.
16 Id. § 2.1, at 47.
'1 A. ALCHIAN & W.R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 193 (2d ed. 1977).
18 1 PINNER'S, supra note 12, U.S.A., Brands and Signs, at 1.
19 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 2.2, at 53.
The development of a law of unfair competition is traceable to the gradual
recognition by the courts of the necessity of protecting the good will of an
enterprise and of preventing competitors from 'reaping where they have
not sown' ..... Because equity would not intervene unless either some
property right of the plaintiff was violated or the elements of another tort
were present . . . a grant of relief was first conceived of as a method of
preventing the deception of the public."
1 PINNER'S, supra note 12, U.S.A., Unfair Competition, at 1.
20 See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 915 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Trademark infringement is a species of this generic concept
[of unfair competition law]."); Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d
925, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ("under the common law of unfair competition, including the
law of trademarks which is a part of it . . ... "); E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 263 (3d ed. 1986) ("Indeed, trademark
doctrines have historically been viewed as a specialized branch of the more general law
of unfair competition.").
21 Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
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Although this doctrinal distinction exists, both sets of laws have
common goals related to free and fair competition. Both attempt to bal-
ance "the interests of entrepreneurs in securing goodwill, the interests
of consumers in not being deceived as to the source of goods and ser-
vices, and the interests of competitors in not being disabled from using
[configurations necessary to compete]." 22
2.1.2. Important Provisions
Unfair competition is generally governed by state law.2" Similarly,
most states provide trademark protection for product configuration
rights acquired through trading within the state.2 These statutes are of
limited consequence,25 however, because the protection they provide is
limited both geographically and substantively.26 Because of this limita-
tion, most trademark protection in the United States is granted and
governed by the Trademark Act of 1946 (known as the Lanham Act).2"
"Although [this Act] imposes registration as a prerequisite to protec-
tion, federal trademark law closely follows unfair competition law's
substantive principles."2 This is clear not only from the sections of the
Lanham Act that will be discussed below,29 but the final section of the
Act as well, which states:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce...
by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks . . .; to protect registered marks . . . from interfer-
ence by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons
...against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and decep-
22 I PINNER'S, supra note 12, U.S.A., Brands and Signs, at 1.
" See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (Federal patent
law is not a barrier to enforcement of a "trade secret" contract under state law.).
24 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 22.1, at 23; 1 PINNER'S, supra note 12,
U.S.A., Survey.
2" 1 PINNER'S, supra note 12, U.S.A., Brands and Signs, at 3.
26 Id.; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 22.1, at 25. In general, however, the
type of protection provided and the mode of protection used in individual states very
closely imitates federal trademark law. See, e.g., Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen
Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1986) (trademark protection laws in Pennsylvania are
very similar to federal law).
27 The Lanham Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982 & Supp. III
1985). See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce...;
to protect registered marks ...from interference by State, or territorial legislation
28 E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 20, at 264. For example, the fundamen-
tal rule of unfair competition that rights are honored only to the extent of a mark's
actual use is paralleled in the Lanham Act's requirement that, to be registered, a mark
must already be in use commercially in connection with goods or services. Id. The
requirement of actual use is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (preamble).
2" See infra text accompanying notes 31-37 & 44-47.
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tion .. .; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties . . . respecting trade-marks, trade names, and unfair
competition. 0
Under the Act, the owners1 of a product configuration s' may reg-
ister it on the "Principal Register""3 if it is actually used in commerce 4
and if the owner complies with certain procedural matters. 5
"Actual use," the first fundamental concept embodied in the law,
requires the product configuration to be used in commerce prior to the
time the owner seeks to register it. 6 Thus, "ownership [of a trademark]
rests on adoption and use, not registration. '3 7 A second fundamental
30 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
SI As used in the Act, the word person "and any other word or term used to
designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege . . . under . . . this
chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term 'juristic person'
includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing
and being sued in a court of law." Id.
2 "Trade mark" is defined as including "any word, name, symbol or device or
any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify
his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." Id.
" There are two different registers upon which to register a trademark in the
United States. These are known as the Principal Register and the Supplemental Regis-
ter. The requirements for registration on the Principal Register are listed in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051, and include what one would normally consider necessary for the registration of
a trademark - distinctiveness, use, and procedural requirements. Registration on the
Principal Register confers certain procedural and substantive advantages on the owner,
such as automatic federal jurisdiction, id. § 1121; recoverability of treble damages, id. §
1117; and the allowance of proof of the registration as prima facie evidence of owner-
ship and exclusive rights, id. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a). Many of these advantages are not
available with registration on the Supplemental Register. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra
note 12, § 19.8, at 887. Many marks capable of distinguishing an applicant's goods or
services and not registrable on the Principal Register may be registered on the Supple-
mental Register as long as they have been in lawful use in commerce for the year
immediately preceding the registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1091. Registration on the Supple-
mental Register, however, confers no substantive rights beyond those granted under
common law. See Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1968).
One of the main reasons for the existence of the Supplemental Register is to en-
able persons in the United States to domestically register marks so they can obtain
registration under the laws of other countries. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §
19.8, at 886. This is possible because many foreign nations (including Britain) auto-
matically allow registration (and provide protection) without prior use based on regis-
tration in the United States. Id. § 19.1, at 877.
3 "[A] mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce . . . when it is placed in
any manner on. . .goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on
the tags or labels affixed thereto and the goods are sold or transported in commerce
." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
s See id. § 1051.
8 For a discussion of ways to mitigate the harshness of the use requirement, see
Harrison, How to Maintain a United States Trademark Registration Without Use in
Commerce; Section 8 and Registrations Under Section 44, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 254
(1984).
$7 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 19.4, at 881; see E. KINTNER & J. LAHR,
AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw PRIMER 263 (2d ed. 1982).
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concept is that no configuration may be registered that is so similar to
another one already in use that the new configuration would cause con-
fusion, mistake or deception. 8 This is known as the "likelihood of con-
fusion" standard. 9 The concept is often the central issue in many
trademark cases,'0 leading courts to examine many factual issues re-
garding the product, 1 the configuration at issue,'2 and different aspects
of the market in which the product competes."3 Both the substantive
and procedural elements of the Act are brought together in the overall
protection provided the owner of a properly registered and maintained
product configuration: "Any registration . . . on the principal register
. . . and owned by a party to an action shall . . . be prima facie evi-
dence of [an] exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on
the goods or services . . . ."" Where there is sufficient use but no re-
gistration, the same protection can be obtained by way of section 43(a)
The registration of any configuration is valid for twenty years from the date of
issuance, provided the owner files an affidavit during the sixth year of its use asserting
that the configuration is in use in commerce or, if it is not in use, that the owner has no
intention of abandoning it and has a legitimate excuse for not using it. 15 U.S.C. §
1058(a). Failure to file such an affidavit will result in cancellation of the registration at
the end of the sixth year. Id.
Such registration may be renewed indefinitely for periods of twenty years as long
as all the initial requirements continue to be met and certain procedural requirements
are followed. Id. § 1059. This is in direct contrast to the treatment afforded patents.
These last for a limited period of time (regardless of the number of assignments of the
patent), after which time the protection expires, releasing the subject matter into the
public domain. Id. at 66.
Additionally, the right to a configuration may become incontestable after use in
commerce for five consecutive years provided the initial requirements continue to be
met and no final decision has been rendered adverse to the owner's claim of ownership.
15 U.S.C. § 1065.
s See 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
a Schuman, supra note 6, at 782.
40 Id. at 781 ("The essential issue in trademark infringement actions is whether
the purchasers are likely to be misled or confused as to the source of different prod-
ucts."); see also Vitek Systems, Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, 675 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir.
1982); Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. P.R.
1981), affd 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir. 1982) (essential question in both cases was whether
purchasers would be misled or confused).
41 See, e.g., Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg., 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1986)
(examination of the different weaves and color combinations used in dishtowels deter-
minative as to outcome on both distinctiveness and functionality).
42 See, e.g., Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148 (3d
Cir. 1984) (comparison of trade dress of different bottles for wine to determine whether
confusion over secondary meaning existed).
' See Scott Paper Company v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225 (3d Cir.
1978) (owner of registered mark for paper goods denied injunctive relief against owner
of similar trademark for household cleaners because the two products were sold in
different markets with only marginal likelihood of confusion regarding their source).
The "likelihood of confusion" is more fully examined infra text accompanying
notes 56-73.
" 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
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of the Act,4 which provides:
[a]ny person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in con-
nection with any goods . . . or any containers for goods...
any false description or representation, including words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the
same, and. . . cause [the same] to enter into commerce,...
shall be liable to ... any person who believes that he is or
is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false descrip-
tion or representation."6
The broad review possible under this section has permitted courts to
fashion doctrines granting protection to deserving unregistered marks
without violating the standards for distinctiveness set forth in the
statute.47
2.2. Common Law Protection
Where a product configuration has been registered and properly
maintained, an action for its infringement may be brought based on its
registration alone.48 The burden of proof is then on the owner of the
allegedly infringing configuration to show why there has been no in-
fringement.49 Where a configuration has not been registered, however,
its owner is not entitled to the presumption of exclusive use that pro-
tects a statutory registration.5" Instead, each time protection is sought,
the owner must prove that the configuration has achieved sufficient rec-
ognition in the marketplace, and request protection based on this proof
alone.
To facilitate actions where the owner of a product configuration
legitimately deserves protection,5" federal courts have long held that the
Lanham Act protects unregistered as well as registered configura-
45 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
46 Id.; see also infra note 52 and accompanying text.
47 See infra text accompanying notes 48-81.
411 See supra text accompanying note 44; see also supra note 33.
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).
50 See American Diabetes Ass'n v. National Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 19
(E.D. Pa. 1981), afl'd per curiam, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982) (Since the designation
for which protection is sought is not registered, "plaintiffs are required to prove that
the mark can be protected and that it has achieved a secondary meaning.").
"' This would occur where, for example, the public has become so familiar with
an unregulated product or its configuration that it associates the same connotations
with its purchase that it does with the purchase of a product or configuration protected
by a registered mark. This is not a difficult scenario to hypothesize, since most consum-
ers probably do not know (or care) if a configuration is registered or not.
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tions.52 The reason for this policy is clear: where the consuming public
has come to recognize a configuration and to associate it with a particu-
lar merchant, protection should follow regardless of registration since,
in effect, the configuration has essentially obtained the recognition the
statute requires for protection."3 In providing protection in this area,
however, the courts have acted without substantial statutory guidance,"
and have derived their own conceptual standards to duplicate and inter-
pret the practical standards dictated by the statute.55
2.2.1. Secondary Meaning
The first of these important conceptual standards is "secondary
meaning," often used as a proxy for distinctiveness, is the yardstick
used to measure likelihood of confusion. 56 The more distinctive a prod-
uct or configuration is from other products or configurations that per-
" See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315
(1938); see also SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d
1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[Siection 43(a) proscribes not only acts that would techni-
cally qualify as infringement, but also unfair competitive practices involving actual or
potential deception."); Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642
(2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the Lanham Act makes "certain types of unfair competition
federal statutory torts, whether or not they involve infringement of a registered trade-
mark."); Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir.
1963) ("The legislative history of the Lanham Act indicates that Congress intended to
fashion a new federal remedy against a particular kind of unfair competition that the
common law had effectively protected.").
"' See supra text accompanying notes 31-43. Furthermore, denying protection to
such configurations would actually be against consumers' best interests. Since other
merchants would probably rush to the market with similar products or configurations,
confusion among consumers would arise where there had been none before. Providing
protection thus serves as notice to merchants who may desire to use the configuration in
which ownership is being claimed.
" There is, for example, no definition of distinctiveness (which is used to measure
likelihood of confusion) in the Lanham Act. Although the statute delineates a broad
likelihood of confusion standard, its guidance ends there. 'It makes no attempts to create
a narrower, more useful standard for the courts to apply. It fails to consider, for exam-
ple, that what is not deceiving due to accepted advertising methods in one decade may
become completely deceiving in another as more complex advertising practices become
accepted. In addition, while the statute implies that it is deception to the ultimate con-
sumer which is to be measured, it fails to consider products or configurations purchased
by consumers of differing levels of sophistication.
U See supra text accompanying notes 12-22.
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (which defines a trademark as
"any word, name, symbol or device . . . used by a manufacturer . . . to identify and
distinguish his goods . . . from those. . . sold by others. . . ."); see also Application
of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 931 (C.C.P.A. 1964) ("Section 45 re-
quires not only the adoption and use of the mark but that it does in fact identify the
goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others. This require-
ment is the basic element of a trademark."); E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 37, at
257 ("The extent to which a mark will be protected relates directly to the degree of
distinctiveness it possesses . . ").
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form the same function, the less likely it is to cause confusion.5 7
The courts have divided the field of distinctiveness into four sepa-
rate categories: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanci-
ful. Each category represents a different degree of distinctiveness by
which all marks were analyzed.58 "Generic" generally refers to terms
commonly used to describe factual aspects of products.59 Generic terms
are not given protection because they describe what the product is
rather than identifying the product and distinguishing it from those
sold by others. 60
At the other end of the spectrum are arbitrary or fanciful marks.
Fanciful marks are phrases coined for the express purpose of function-
ing as trademarks."' Similarly, arbitrary marks consist of words or
symbols taken from common usage and arbitrarily applied to goods in
such a way that they are not descriptive of what the goods do or are. 2
Both fanciful and arbitrary marks receive per se protection.
Similar to fanciful marks are suggestive marks. These "[require]
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the
nature of [the] goods [they describe]."63 Both fanciful and suggestive
marks are considered "inherently distinctive."'" They are registrable
"" See E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, supra note 37, at 275.
5s See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th
Cir. 1983); see also 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11.1, at 433.
11 See American Diabetes Ass'n v. National Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 19
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
" I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 12.1, at 520. The justification is that if one
merchant of the good can monopolize something generic to the industry, such as a term
necessary to describe the food or a feature necessary to the functioning of the good, no
other merchant will be able to market competing goods. Thus, competition and progress
will suffer, and the public interest will be harmed. See, e.g., National Conference of
Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983) (term "multi-state bar examination" held to be generic);
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (term
"thermos" held not protectable because generic); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F.
505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (term "aspirin" held to be generic and not protectable because the
public associated the term with cold medicine in general, as opposed to one merchant's
cold medicine (Bayer)).
61 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11.2, at 435.
62 Id.; see, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963)
(upholding the mark "polaroid" as fanciful mark for optical devices and cameras); Ar-
row Distilleries, Inc. v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941) (upholding
the mark "Arrow" as arbitrary for liqueurs); Clorox Chem. Co. v. Chlorit Mfg. Corp.,
25 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (upholding the validity of "Clorox" as fanciful mark
for bleach); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
365 (T.T.A.B. 1970) (granting protection to the term "Command" as an arbitrary
mark for hair care products).
" Stix Prod., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
" American Diabetes Ass'n v. National Diabetes Ass'n, 533 F. Supp. 16, 19
(E.D. Pa. 1981), affd per curiam, 681 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 10:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/5
PRODUCT CONFIGURATION PROTECTION
and protectable immediately upon use, without proof that consumers
recognize and associate them with particular goods.6 5
Between generic and suggestive marks are descriptive marks. A
mark is descriptive if it describes the intended purpose, function or use,
size, class of users, desirable characteristics or end effect on the user of
the product.66 Descriptive marks are generally not given protection be-
cause they can be applied to a wide range of related products,6" and
because the words or adjectives used are, like many generic terms, con-
sidered to be in the public domain.68 However, descriptive marks are
treated less restrictively than generic marks. Descriptive marks can re-
ceive protection if they have achieved some measure of distinction in the
marketplace.69 This distinction is known as "secondary meaning."70 It
is the common law's attempt to analyze the image created in buyers'
minds by a mark that, "in that trade and to that branch of the purchas-
ing public, . . . ha[s] come to mean that the article was [a single
merchant's] product; in other words, had come to be, to them, his trade-
mark."71 Secondary meaning is usually created through extensive ad-
vertising in one particular market, constantly stressing the association
between the mark and the good. 2 In litigation, it is usually proven
empirically, with consumer surveys, evidence of advertising budgets and
sales figures. 3
2.2.2. Functionality
The second important common law standard is known as "func-
tionality. 747 This doctrine mandates that a configuration cannot receive
"" 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11.2, at 435; see, e.g., Sweet Sixteen Co. v.
Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926) (upholding the validity of the term
"Sweet Sixteen" as suggestive); Orange Crush Co. v. California Crushed Fruit, 297 F.
892 (D.C. Cir. 1924) (granting protection to the term "Orange Crush" based on its
suggestiveness).
66 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 11.4, at 442-43.
67 See id. (this area includes self-laudatory or "puffing" marks).
6' Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180
(C.C.P.A. 1972); see, e.g., Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Estee Lauder, Inc., 533
F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1976) (term "After Tan" found descriptive of time of application of
sunburn medicine); Sterling Prods. Co. v. Crest Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 204 (E.D.
Mich. 1970) (term "Litter Basket" found descriptive of function of trash receptacle).
69 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 15.1, at 656.
70 Id.
71 G & C Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912) (term "Web-
ster's Dictionary" found descriptive of dictionaries on basis of secondary meaning).
71 Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 589 F.2d 1225, 1228 (3d Cir. 1978).
71 See id. For examples of form statements from customers and merchants submit-
ted as evidence of secondary meaning, see 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 15.26, at
717.
7" The requirement of non-functionality is not mandated by statute. It is strictly a
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protection "if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article.""5 There are two principle
rationales for using this doctrine to help screen products or configura-
tions for those deserving of protection. First, protecting functional con-
figurations with trademark rights would inhibit competition within that
particular industry or market, 6 because other merchants of the same
product could be prohibited from including a configuration that is nec-
essary to the functioning of the good itself.77 Second, "if functional fea-
tures were given protection, such protection would clearly clash with
the objective of federal patent law."'7 8 Patent law, which only grants
exclusive rights over new inventions for a limited time,7 9 would be de-
feated if a single merchant could effectively obtain a patent of infinite
duration on a feature necessary to the functioning of the product.8"
Summarizing the use of these doctrines, it is clear that a non-regis-
tered configuration can receive protection if it is both non-functional
and distinctive, either inherently or via secondary meaning.8
common law doctrine created by the courts to express their view that the fundamental
right to compete by copying a competitor's product exists. In re Morton-Norwich
Prod., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
"75 Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982); see
also Fletcher, The Defense of "Functional" Trademark Use: If What is Functional
Cannot Be a Trademark, How Can a Trademark Be Functional?, 75 TRADEMARK
REP. 249, 249 (1985).
78 See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339; Zelnick, supra note 7, at 128.
7 For example, if General Motors were allowed to obtain a trademark (or pat-
ent) on rubber tires, and other auto makers could be precluded from producing rubber
tires, then (most likely) General Motors would have a monopoly on the production of
rubber tires. Consumers would be hurt not only by the lack of variety, but by monopo-
listic pricing as well. See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1336.
1 I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 7.26(A), at 236.
' Seventeen years for functional patents, 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982), and fourteen
years for design patents, 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1982).
" 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 7.26(A), at 236. Under the doctrine of
functionality, trademark protection has been denied for things such as the design of a
mathematical handicapping formula for a computerized handicap golf system, United
States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., 749 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1984); an exterior wall-
mounted industrial light fixture, Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822
(3d Cir. 1981); the ribbed design on the top of a construction worker's hard hat, Mine
Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901 (C.C.P.A. 1969);
and the shape of a clip on a pocket pen, In re Lindey Pen Co., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
634 (T.T.A.B. 1968). Examples of items held non-functional in spite of a strong chal-
lenge to the contrary include a cheerleading uniform, Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); the exterior design of a
grain semi-trailer, Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.
1976); and a shower head spray nozzle, Teledyne Indus. v. Windmere Prods., 433 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
1 See Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir.
1984); see also infra text accompanying notes 82-117.
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2.3. Liquid Container Protection Using Secondary Meaning and
Functionality"2
Relying upon the above concepts, 8 United States courts and the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)"" have granted protection to
merchants of goods (mainly liquids) that cannot form their own
container or take on any consistent shape, therefore protecting the de-
sign, shape, and overall configuration of the distinctive containers in
which such goods are marketed. 5
st Since the primary purpose of this Comment is to examine the House of Lord's
decision regarding Coke's registration of a configuration (a bottle) for a liquid product
(the soft-drink), the focus of the remainder of the discussion will narrow to examining
cases directly relevant to this specific area. Where cases relating to non-liquid products
are relevant to the analysis, they will be examined as appropriate.
It is important to note, however, that the terms used - container and product
configuration - and the concepts involved cover a very broad area within trademark
law, and can have very significant effects on both competition and the availability of
consumer goods. First, there are cases concerning containers for solid goods. Many of
these goods could in essence be shaped, molded, or otherwise produced in a way that no
"container" is needed in which to sell them, other than possibly a clear plastic covering
to prevent the product from falling apart or spoiling. Using this line of reasoning,
courts have denied protection for a cylindrical metal container for crackers, Keebler Co.
v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1980); a molded plastic package for
sliced luncheon meats, In re Oscar Mayer Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 295 (T.T.A.B.
1975); and a ribbed paper packet for salt and pepper, In re Diamond Crystal Salt Co.,
161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (T.T.A.B. 1969).
Second, there are cases concerning a particular design, shape, or configuration of
the product itself, which may or may not function as its own container or trade dress.
The scope of cases within this group is extensive. Protection has been denied for the
pie-shape of a fishing tackle box, In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d 841 (C.C.P.A.
1980); the round shape of a thermostat, In re Honeywell, Inc, 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A.
1976); as well as the shape of a special rhomboidal table top designed for concentrating
and cleaning iron ore, In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961);
and a unique curved shape given to index cards, Oxford Pendaflex Corp. v. Rolodex
Corp., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 249 (T.T.A.B. 1979). However, protection has been al-
lowed for jewelry in the shape of a key, In re Penthouse Int'l, 565 F.2d 679 (C.C.P.A.
1977); and the overall configuration of a solid chemical composition compressed into a
triangular shape, Application of Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836
(C.C.P.A. 1964).
A broad overview, as well as an appreciation of the commercial importance of the
field can be gleaned from Schuman, supra note 6. For a discussion of the role of the
related fields of copyright and unfair competition in protecting trade dress, see Patti-
shall, Protection of Labels Through Copyright Infringement and Unfair Competition
Laws, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 408 (1966).
" While primary authority allowing protection for containers and similar con-
figurations comes from the statute itself, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982 & Supp. 1111985),
the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office must place substantial reliance on the
doctrines of functionality and secondary meaning, since the containers in which such
goods are marketed are rarely inherently distinctive. 1 J. McCARTHY, Supra note 12, §
7.31, at 264.
" The PTO is the administrative body established to decide in the first instance
whether a trademark should issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 86-111. There are also many cases where
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One of the earliest reported cases occurred before the Lanham Act
existed. The case, however, was decided on the same basic principles as
those used in the Act. Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers' Co. con-
cerned the Hires Root Beer bottle., 6 For marketing reasons, Hires
adopted "[a] new, peculiar, and distinctive form of bottle."8" The bever-
age grew in popularity, and the court found that the shape or style of
the bottle was the principal method of identification used by purchas-
ers."8 Hires was thus granted an injunction against a competitor who
intentionally imitated the bottle."9
Another pre-Lanham Act case was Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. George
W. Button Corp.9 In that case, the court found a cologne bottle to be
both non-functional and distinctive, noting that "the shape was novel in
the trade . . . [and that] the bottle's contents were identified as the
plaintiff's manufacture by the bottle which was the container."9 " An
injunction was granted "forbidding the defendant [from] mer-
chandis[ing] . . . its cologne . . . in bottles . . .having the same pro-
portions and symmetry as the plaintiff's bottle or so substantially like it
...as to be confusing."92
The first principal post-Lanham Act case dealt with the Scotch
protection has been denied for containers and other configurations used to market liq-
uid goods. While several of these cases will be discussed or mentioned, it is critical to
note that protection, in most, if not all cases, was not denied because the item for which
registration was sought was a container or configuration per se. Rather, protection was
denied because the registrant failed to show either non-functionality or distinction (usu-
ally through secondary meaning). See, e.g., In re Mclhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (Tabasco sauce bottle refused protection because bottle shape not in-
herently distinctive and insufficient proof of secondary meaning); In re Johnson &
Johnson, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371 (T.T.A.B. 1961), appeal dismissed, 312 F.2d 455
(C.C.P.A. 1963) (glue bottle refused registration because of failure to prove secondary
meaning in bottle shape alone).
It should also be noted that, while registration on the Principal Register is the
object of all the cases and registrations discussed here, registration on the Supplemental
Register may provide some protection for owners unable to receive protection anywhere
else. See, e.g., In re The Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959)
("[Olne of the basic purposes of the Supplemental Register was to provide U.S. regis-
tration of a distinctive package - even though the design is patented in this country -
in order that the registrant might use such registration to obtain ...protection in
foreign countries . . ").
" Charles E. Hires Co. v. Consumers' Co., 100 F. 809 (7th Cir. 1900).
87 Id. at 809.
88 Id. at 810.
89 Id. at 814. Since the case arose before the Lanham Act existed, relief was
granted based on grounds of unfair competition. The effect, however, was the same as
registration on the Principal Register, since the competitor was enjoined from using the
infringing bottles, and was forced to change the design of its bottle.
9 50 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
91 Id. at 709.
92 Id. at 711.
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Whisky bottle known as a "Pinch.""3 There was strong evidence of
non-functionality, especially since the bottle was peculiar in appearance
and "different in shape from any theretofore used by any person or
corporation for the bottling of Scotch Whisky."9 There was also ex-
tremely strong evidence of distinctiveness through secondary meaning
since it was "common knowledge that customers order[ed] [Haig's]
whisky as 'Pinch' and 'Pinch Bottle'."'9 5 Given this evidence, the Com-
missioner of Trademarks held that the contour or conformation of the
container was a trademark entitled to registration on the Principal
Register.96
Regardless of the protection given to a mark, trademark protection
extends only to use in connection with goods so similar that buyers are
not likely to be confused.9" For example, Haig brought suit in 1966
against a maker of bubble bath denoted "PINCHY" and shaving lotion
called "SCOTCH AND Soft-drink.""8 Both products were whisky-
colored and marketed in bottles that were, except for their size, almost
exact duplicates of Haig's "Pinch" bottle.99 The court denied protection
because it was not clear that the public would have been misled into
thinking that Haig produced bath products.' 0
In a situation directly analogous to that examined by the House of
Lords,' 0 ' Coke applied to have its bottle registered in the Principal
Register on March 19, 1959o2 The registration was initially rejected
9 Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Dec. Comm'r Pat.
1958).
" Id. at 230.
95 Id.
" Id. at 231. The Haig bottle thus became the first liquid container configuration
registered on the Principal Register. Lunsford, The Protection of Packages and Con-
tainers, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 567, 573 (1966). Haig also protected its bottle in a
passing-off suit in Scotland against another supplier of whiskey that imitated the spe-
cial bottle. John Haig & Co. v. Forth Bleeding Co., 1953 R.P.C. 259 (Scot. Sess. Cas.).
In Britain, Wales and Scotland, however, the Haig bottle is known as a "dimple." See
id. For a discussion of the tort of passing-off in Britain, see infra note 122 and text
accompanying notes 201-02.
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 7.30, at 261.
" Haig & Haig, Ltd. v. Maradel Prods., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
99 Id. at 577.
100 Id. at 578. This holding was obtained in spite of the fact that Haig had also
trademarked the word PINCH in relation to whiskey. For a discussion asserting that
this holding was unsound, see Lunsford, supra note 96, at 568. See also Diamond,
"Pinchy" Bottle Bubble Bath - Unfair Competition or Good Clean Fun?, ADVERTIS-
ING AGE, March 14, 1966, at 68.
101 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying notes
169-80.
102 See Lunsford, supra note 96, at 572. Since the registration was later approved
by the PTO, see infra text accompanying note 105, no adversarial proceeding took
place from which to draw a written record. This is because the Commissioner usually
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by the examiner because of a lack of proof regarding distinctiveness.103
Coke filed a new application, without appealing the initial rejection,
including a great deal of evidence regarding the distinctiveness its bottle
had achieved with the public.1 ' This second application was accepted,
and the Coke bottle became the second liquid container configuration
registered on the Principal Register, on August 12, 1960.15
A recent holding of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board dem-
onstrates that functionality, secondary meaning and particularity of
use1"6 are still the principal doctrines applied in considering whether to
grant or deny protection for unregistered configurations. At issue was
the plastic container for a chemical drain opener.1 07 The top portion of
the container was shaped like the pipe trap in a kitchen drain. 08 The
examiner for the PTO denied protection because he felt the bottle
merely indicated the area of the product's use.109 The Board overturned
this decision and held the shape of the bottle inherently distinctive,1 0
stating:
[i]t is now well settled that while [the] configuration or shape
of a container is not registrable for the container, per se, it
may be registrable for the particular contents thereof if the
shape is nonfunctional . . . and . . . distinctive.11
An examination of most cases in which protection was denied indi-
cates that the sole reason for the denial was the registrant's failure to
prove either non-functionality or distinctiveness. In Application of Mo-
gen David Wine Corp.,"'2 for example, protection was denied for the
bottle of a very popular wine11 because there was insufficient evidence
only publishes a statement including facts, issues, and reasons when registration has
been refused. The information herein, regarding this registration, is taken mostly from
Lunsford, supra note 96; the actual notice of the initial registration, PTO, Trademark
Reg. No. 696,147 (approved Aug. 12, 1960); and the notices filed to maintain the
registration.
103 See Lunsford, supra note 96, at 572.
104 Id.
105 Id. The first was Haig's "Pinch" bottle, Trademark Reg. No. 670,723. Both
bottles have acquired incontestable trademark rights in America. Lunsford, supra note
96, at 573 n.28.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
.0. In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566 (T.T.A.B.
1977).
108 Id. at 567.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 568.
111 Id. at 567-68.
112 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
113 See Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 927 (C.C.P.A.
1967) (this earlier version of the case relates to a different issue and is incorporated by
reference in 372 F.2d at 541).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/5
PRODUCT CONFIGURATION PROTECTION
of distinctiveness of the container's shape, as opposed to the decoration
on it. "The average purchaser [was] likely to recognize and identify
[the] wine by the written [trade mark "MOGEN DAVID"] and picto-
rial representations prominently displayed on the label and neck band
rather than on the confidingly of the rather prosaic bottle, per se." ''
Similarly, the small glass bottle used for Tabasco sauce was denied
registration because it was not inherently distinctive,"1 5 and because it
was "a little bottle with no features particularly connecting it with the
pepper sauce except [that] the pepper sauce itself11 ' [gave] . . . the bot-
tle and sauce together the characteristic of being descriptive.
117
3. BRITISH TRADEMARK PROTECTION
3.1. Statutory Protection
3.1.1. General Concepts
The fundamental concepts underlying British trademark law are
very similar to those underlying United States trademark law. 8 As
with trademark law in America, British trademark law developed ini-
tially to prevent unfair trade practices.1 9 Consistent with the needs of
merchants to differentiate their goods from those of competitors, 20 the
law progressed from punishing fraudulent sales perpetrated by false
representations ("passing off") to punishing the mere use of another's
mark or name on a product. 21 Today, the statutory right regarding
114 372 F.2d at 542.
11 In re Mcllhenny Co., 278 F.2d 953 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
118 The bottle was clear. Its coloring, therefore, came from the sauce inside.
11 278 F.2d at 956; see also Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366
(1st Cir. 1980) (holding that a standard, cylindrical-shaped can for crackers was not
protectable because it was functional); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lander Co., 164 F.2d
395 (2d Cir. 1947) (denying protection for a cologne bottle because it had not acquired
any secondary meaning); California Crushed Fruit Corp. v. Taylor Beverage & Candy
Co., 38 F.2d 885 (W.D. Wis. 1930) (denying protection to frosted black bottle used for
fruit juice because of a lack of secondary meaning, but granting protection to certain
bottles that had the provider's name blown into the glass at the bottom of the bottle).
11 See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, § 5.2, at 133 (discussing the parallel
development of English and American common law relating to unfair competition or
"passing off" in the eighteenth century). Because of this similarity, a much more lim-
ited discussion of British statutory trademark law will be given compared to that given
for American trademark law. See also infra notes 128-42 and accompanying text.
119 See 48 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND l 1, at 5 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
HALSBURY'S]. Originally, actions in this area were based on the common law of fraud
or deceit. Law and equity then developed differently, with equity courts willing to
recognize and protect the exclusive right to use a trade name or mark, even in the
absence of fraud, as a property right. Berlei (UK) Ltd. v. Bali Brassiere Co., [1969] 2
All E.R. 812 (H.L.); see also supra note 19.
120 See 48 HALSBURY'S, supra note 119, 1, at 5.
121 Id.
1988]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
registered trademarks and the common law right of passing off122 form
122 The elements of an action for passing-off are (1) a misrepresentation (2) made
by a trader in the course of trade (3) to prospective customers or ultimate consumers of
goods (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the
sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual
damage to the business or goodwill of another trader. Erven Warnink B.V. v. J. Town-
end & Sons (Hull), [1979] 2 All E.R. 927, 932-33. Passing-off is a tort action in
Britain, analogous to actions under state unfair competition law in America. There are
several reported instances in the United Kingdom where the supplier of a configuration
or container for liquid goods has been successful in a passing-off suit against the sup-
plier of an infringing configuration. For example, in 1961 Coke brought such a suit
against another supplier of soft-drinks in Scotland. The Coca-Cola Co. v. A.G. Barr &
Co., 1961 R.P.C. 387 (Scot. Sess. Cas.). Coke alleged that its own bottle had a distinc-
tive shape and that the consuming public in Scotland recognized this shape as indicat-
ing a connection between Coke (the beverage) and Coca-Cola (the company). Id. at
388. Since an agreement was reached before trial to the effect that Barr (the infringing
party) would stop using the allegedly similar bottle for beverages that were the same
color as Coke, no injunction was granted. Id. Lord Walker noted, however, that an
injunction would have been issued had an agreement not been reached: "petitioners
have made out a prima fade case that the bottle used by [Barr] might well be mistaken
by members of the public for the petitioners' bottle containing their Coca-Cola." Id.
Similarly, Haig brought suit in Scotland in 1953 to protect its distinctive "Pinch"
bottle, known there as a "dimple." John Haig & Co. v. Forth Bleeding Co., 1953
R.P.C. 259 (Scot. Sess. Cas.). This case pointed out what most other passing-off cases
also make clear - that what was being protected was not the shape or design of the
bottle per se, but the entire image of the product (known in passing-off cases as "get-
up"), which may or may not include the design of the container used. Id. at 262. Thus,
"[a] container such as a bottle may be part of the get-up of goods of a trader if it is of a
peculiar shape which catches the eye of the ordinary purchaser." Id. (emphasis added).
See also Reckitt & Colman Prods. Ltd. v. Borden Inc. (Q.B. Ch. Div., July 9, 1986)
(LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) ("The plaintiffs' claim is based essentially upon
an allegation of distinctiveness in the get-up of a container for the lemon juice which
they have now been selling for some 30 years . . . .What is perfectly plain on the
evidence is that the plaintiffs are not in a position to assert that they and they alone can
sell lemon juice in [plastic] lemon shaped containers.").
The point made by these cases is critical to understanding the difference between
protecting a configuration from direct, immediate infringement in a passing-off suit and
protecting the same configuration by registering it on the national register. While a
similar result may be achieved with either method, it is clear that registering a config-
uration on the general register provides far greater protection for the owner than could
be achieved through a series of passing-off suits. Registration is likely to cost much less
than pursuing an unknown and possibly large number of lawsuits. Registration is also
more definite and final than a series of passing-off suits. Once the configuration is
registered, it never has to be registered again. Assuming continued use and proper ap-
plication in the future, the right established becomes unequivocal and incontestable
against all parties. A series of passing-off suits would not provide such protection, since
the owner desirous of protecting his configuration would have to prove in each separate
case that his configuration had achieved the necessary distinction with regard to the
allegedly infringing configuration. Each time, a defendant owner would be allowed to
defeat the infringement claim by raising as a defense the fact that his own goods were
not designed with an intent to profit from the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiff.
Thus the presumption of exclusive use available to the owner of a registered configura-
tion would not be available to such a plaintiff. See T. BLANCO WHITE & R. JACOB,
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 60 (3d ed. 1986)
("Where [registration] is possible it enables the expensive and uncertain action for
passing-off to be almost completely replaced by the cheaper and more reliable action for
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distinct branches of the law in the United Kingdom.12 This develop-
ment is almost identical to the concurrent existence of federal trade-
mark law and state unfair competition law in the United States. 24
Trademarks serve the same functions within the British economy
as they do in the United States economy, including the encouragement
of the production of quality goods,125 the reduction of information-gath-
ering costs for consumers,126 and the balancing of the interests of entre-
preneurs, consumers and competitors.12
3.1.2. Important Provisions
The current legislation governing trademarks in Britain is the
Trade Marks Act of 1938.12 s The Act has effect throughout the United
Kingdom and must therefore be applied uniformly in all
jurisdictions. 29
Under the Act, the applicant for registration of a trademark130
infringement of trade mark.").
Registration also provides the owner with a saleable, assignable asset. See Trade
Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 24. The possession of such an asset would
obviously increase the value (including goodwill) of the owner's business to a far
greater extent than would the probability of winning an unpredictable number of law-
suits in the future.
Another reason a passing-off suit is not as effective as registration is that with a
passing-off suit, the owner must actually wait for a competitor to enter the market for
the good in question and (possibly) take away some of the owner's market share before
suit can be brought. This is not the case with a registered configuration, since unequiv-
ocal protection is provided the owner before a competitor enters the marketplace with
an infringing configuration. See infra note 134. Thus, the probability of permanent
damage to market share is far less with registration than with a series of passing-off
suits.
For an excellent discussion of the present-day use of passing-off, see T. BLANCO
WHITE & R. JACOB, supra, at 100-07.
123 See 48 HALSBURY'S, supra note 119, % 1, at 5.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
127 See T. BLANCO WHITE & R. JACOB, supra note 122, at 60; supra text ac-
companying note 22.
128 1 & 2 Geo 6, ch. 22. The Act consolidated the Trade Marks Act, 1905, ch. 15,
the Trade Marks Act, 1919, ch. 79, and the Trade Marks (Amendment) Act, 1937, ch.
49. Many provisions of the Act of 1938 are therefore derived from provisions of the
earlier Acts. See 48 HALSBURY'S, supra note 119, 4, at 6.
12' See Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 71(3) ("It is hereby declared that this Act ex-
tends to Northern Ireland"). A trademark registered in the United Kingdom is prop-
erty situated there even though it is the mark of a foreign manufacturer. 48 HALS-
BURY'S, supra note 119, 6, at 7.
1' "Trade mark" is defined as "a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to
goods for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of
trade between the goods and some person having the right either as proprietor or as
registered user to use the mark . . . ." Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68(1). "'Mark'
includes any device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, nu-
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must be the proprietor x"" of the mark and must use or intend to use13 2
the mark in commerce." To be registrable in "Part A"" 4 of the regis-
ter, the mark must also be distinctive;13 5 to be registrable in "Part
meral, or any combination thereof." Id. Further,
[r]eferences in [the Act] to the use of a mark shall be construed as refer-
ences to the use of a printed or other visual representation of the mark,
and references therein to the use of a mark in relation to goods shall be
construed as references to the use thereof upon, or in physical or other
relation to, goods.
Id. § 68(2).
131 "Proprietor" is not defined in the Trade Marks Act of 1938. However, § 17
implies that only the person claiming to be the proprietor may apply for registration,
and only the registered proprietor may sue for infringement. See 48 HALSBURY'S,
supra note 119, 28, at 23. By common law rule, the person who first designed or
used the trademark is entitled to claim proprietorship in it. Re Application of Vitamins
Ltd., [1955] 3 All E.R. 827 (Q.B. Ch. Div.).
132 "Used or proposed to be used" is not separately defined in the Trade Marks
Act of 1938 either. However, there must be a genuine and present intention to use the
trademark in trade for a profit. 48 HALSBURY'S, supra note 119, % 30, at 124. The
mere contemplation of future use will not suffice. Id.
133 48 HALSBURY'S, supra note 119, 25, at 20. "A trademark must be registered
in respect of particular goods or classes of goods." Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 3.
134 The primary registration book in Britain is called the general register. It is
divided into two parts, Part A and Part B. Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 1(2). Part A has
stricter requirements for registration ("distinctive" versus "capable of distinguishing")
and gives the proprietor "the exclusive right to use of the trademark" in relation to
goods in respect of which it is registered. Id. § 4(1). This right is infringed when any
person uses an identical trademark or one so nearly resembling the registered trade-
mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, in the course of trade, which causes
the infringing trademark to be taken either as the registered trademark or a negative
comparison with the registered trademark. Id. § 4. Furthermore, the trademark be-
comes "valid" (incontestable) after seven years of use, provided the registration was not
obtained by fraud. Id. at § 13(1).
Registration in Part B grants to the proprietor the same rights as in Part A regis-
tration except that (1) the trademark does not automatically become "valid" after seven
years of use, id. § 13(2), and (2) a defendant in a case of alleged infringement is
allowed to plead (and defeat the claim based on proof) that the alleged infringing trade-
mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. Id. § 5(2).
It is generally easier to obtain registration in Part B than in Part A. See 48 HALS-
BURY'S, supra note 119, % 54, at 44. Also, it is common for marks registered in Part B
to obtain registration in Part A after use sufficient to give the trademark the distinctive-
ness necessary for registration in Part A. Id. Further, a trademark may be registered in
Part B notwithstanding a registration in Part A. Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 10(3).
There are also two specialized registers, known as the Manchester Record and the
Sheffield Register. The Manchester Record is a copy of all entries in the general regis-
ter related to trademarks registered with respect to textile goods. 48 HALSBURY'S,
supra note 119, % 39, at 32. The Sheffield Register is for entering trademarks with
respect to metal goods, such as cutlery and ancient armaments. Id. 38, at 31. This
register actually forms part of the general register, and marks entered on the Sheffield
Register must also be registered on the general register. Id.
13. Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 9. The statute itself defines certain trademarks as
inherently distinctive, such as "the name of a company, individual, or firm, represented
in a special or particular manner," id. § 9(1)(a); "the signature of the applicant," id. §
9(1)(b); "an invented word or words," id. § 9(1)(c); "a word or words having no direct
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B," 136 the mark must be "capable of distinguishing."'3
The great similarity between the United States and British trade-
mark statutes can be seen by comparing the statement above with the
previous statement of the Lanham Act.138 Both statutes define the term
trademark to include any word, name or device used by a merchant to
identify his goods and set them apart from the goods of others.1"9 Both
statutes require the registrant to claim ownership of the trademark.
1 40
Both statutes set up a two-part registration system that grants exclusive
rights to trademarks registered on a primary register and lesser rights
to trademarks registered on a secondary register."" Further, both stat-
utes seek to prevent confusion or deception in the marketplace by ex-
amining the distinctiveness of trademarks offered for registration and
denying protection to those that are confusingly similar to others al-
ready in use.1
42
reference to the character or quality of the goods and not being according to its ordi-
nary signification a geographical name or a surname," id. § 9(1)(d); or "any other
distinctive mark," id. § 9(1)(e). "Distinctive" means adapted to distinguish goods with
which the proprietor of the trademark is or may be connected in the course of trade
from goods in the case of which no such connection subsists. Id. § 9(2).
136 See supra note 134.
117 Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 10. "Capable of distinguishing" is defined in a very
straightforward way: capable of distinguishing goods with which the proprietor of the
trademark is or may be connected in the course of trade from goods for which no such
connection subsists. Id. § 10(1). Thus, virtually all the elements considered relevant to
registrability in Part A are considered relevant to registrability in Part B. 48 HALs-
BURY'S, supra note 119, 1 54. The principal difference is the standard of distinctiveness
required.
This use of two different standards for two different registers is almost identical to
the United States registration system. See supra note 33.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
139 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982 & Supp. 1985) ("The term 'trademark'
includes any word, name, symbol, or device. . . adopted and used by a. . . merchant
to identify and distinguish his goods . . . from those manufactured . . . by others and
to indicate the source of the goods . . ... ") with Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68(1)
(" 'trade mark' means. . . a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for
the purpose of indicating . . . a connection in the course of trade between the goods
and some person having the right either as proprietor or as registered user to use the
mark . . ").
10 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1051 ("The owner of a trade-mark used in commerce
may register his trade-mark.") with Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 17 ("Any person claim-
ing to be the proprietor of a trade mark used or proposed to be used by him . . ").
141 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (principal registration) and § 1091 (supplemental
registration) with Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 4 (Part A registration) and § 5 (Part B
registration).
142 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("The intent of this chapter is to regulate com-
merce . . . by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks . . .)
with Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 9 ("In order for a trade mark . . . to be registrable in
Part A of the register, it must contain or consist of: . any . . . distinctive mark
The principal difference between the statutes is that the United States statute re-
quires actual use of the trademark before any rights will be granted, 15 U.S.C. § 105,
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3.2. Common Law Liquid Container Protection143
While there are a great number of "passing-off" suits brought to
protect containers of liquid goods, 14' there are extremely few cases
brought for infringement of trademark.' 45 For example, in the four
tribunals that heard the Coke case,"4" the only case mentioned that was
on point was Sobrefina S.A.'s Trade Mark Application,1 47 which re-
while the British statute allows an "intent to use" to suffice, Trade Marks Act, 1938,
§§ 68(1), 26.
It is clear that British trademark law gives far more comprehensive guidance
within the statute itself as to what constitutes distinctiveness than United States trade-
mark law does. Compare Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 9 (which not only gives a defini-
tion of distinctiveness but also defines different categories of inherently distinctive
terms) with 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (which prohibits registration of any mark on the Princi-
pal Register in the United States that would cause confusion, mistake or deception
without defining these terms at all or defining categories of inherently distinctive
terms). It is possible that British courts have to spend less time defining and measuring
distinctiveness than United States courts. Therefore, many of the important aspects re-
garding distinctiveness can probably be understood from examining the statute itself, as
opposed to delving deeply into common law. Due to the analysis above and since the
House of Lords in Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695, [1986] 2 All
E.R. 274 (H.L.) did not rely on absence of distinction in its decision, a much less
intense survey of British common law doctrine was undertaken in this section of the
text than was undertaken regarding United States common law.
"" As with the discussion of United States common law relating to the trademark
protection afforded configuration, this section of the text will be limited to a discussion
of those cases directly relevant to the issue of protection for configurations and contain-
ers of liquid goods. For a discussion of other kinds of goods protected by trademark
rights, see supra note 82; 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, §§ 7.34-.37, at 272-79.
14 See T. BLANCO WHITE & R. JACOB, supra note 122, at 60 ("Passing-off
actions are the more numerous, in fact.").
145 Only three cases can be considered relevant: Smith Kline & French Laborato-
ries Ltd. v. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R.
578 (H.L.); Sobrefina S.A.'s Trade Mark Application, 1974 R.P.C. 672 (Q.B. Ch.
Div.); and In re James' Trade Mark, 33 Ch. D. 392 (C.A. 1886), 1886 R.P.C. 340
(C.A.).
See also Re Coca-Cola Co.'s Trade Marks Application, 1985 F.S.R. 315, 323,
1986 R.P.C. 421 (C.A. 1985) (per Sir Denys Buckley) ("Apart from the Sobrefina case
. . . there appears to be no reported decision touching on this point. We have no infor-
mation about how often applications of this kind have been refused or (apart from
Sobrefina) have been appealed.").
146 Initial application in Application of Coca-Cola Co. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695,
[1986] 2 All E.R. 274 (H.L.) was made to the Registrar of Trade Marks. Id. at 696.
Appeal was then taken to the trial examiner, who rendered a decision on December 14,
1983. Id. After registration was denied by the trial examiner, the next appeal was
dismissed by the Court of Appeal on January 23, 1985. The final appeal (also dis-
missed) was to the House of Lords. The final decision came down on May 8, 1986. Id.
at 695-96.
147 Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. 672 (Q.B. Ch. Div.).
Two other cases were mentioned in the opinions, although neither was on point.
The first was the earliest reported case regarding containers of any kind, relating to a
trademark for blocks of lead. James', 33 Ch. D. 392 (C.A. 1886), 1886 R.P.C. 340
(C.A.). While the real issue was whether the supplier James, could use the outline of a
dome-shaped piece of lead as his trademark, there was confusion as to whether James
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lated to a container for beer. " 8 The Registrar in Sobrefina first cited
the definitions of "mark"14 9 and "trademark,"150 then noted that these
definitions were accompanied by a statement in the statute stating:
References in this Act to the use of a mark shall be
construed as references to the use of a printed or other visual
was also trying to prevent others from selling lead in dome-shaped blocks. Id.; see also
Smith Kline, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578, 584 (H.L.) (The trial judge
in James' appeared "to have taken the erroneous view that the effect of the registration
of a trade mark in the shape of a dome would be to make it an infringement of that
trade mark for anyone [else] to make blocks of block lead in that shape."). In dicta
preceding James', Lord Justice Cotton stated "[tihe Appellants here cannot possibly
claim any monopoly in the shape in which they sell their. . . lead . . . ... James', 33
Ch. D. at 394, 1886 R.P.C. at 344. Similarly, Lord Justice Lindley stated "it is obvi-
ous to all lawyers that the Plaintiffs . . . have no monopoly in black lead of this
shape." Id. at 395, 1886 R.P.C. at 334. In reaching the conclusion that James could
stamp the outline of a dome-shaped piece of lead into his blocks of lead and use it as a
trademark, Lord Justice Lindley also stated "[o]ne must be careful to avoid confusion
a mark must be something distinct from the thing marked. The thing itself cannot
be a mark of itself. . . . " Id. at 395, 1886 R.P.C. at 344. The case thus decided the
peripheral issue of the non-registrability of the shape of goods themselves, not their
containers. Erroneously, this case went on to become the primary authority as to the
non-registrability of the shape of both goods and containers even though its holding
dealt only with the shape of goods.
More recently, the issue of whether the outer covering of a capsule for sustained-
release drugs could be registered was addressed in Smith Kline, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914,
[1975] 2 All E.R. 578 (H.L.). The application defined the item being registered as
"[p]harmaceutical substances sold in pellet form with capsules [with a solid color ap-
plied to one-half the capsule and no color applied to the other half, so that the multi-
colored pellets inside were visible through the clear half] . . . ." Id. at 916, [1975] 2
All E.R. at 584. While there was no direct assertion that the capsules were containers
for the goods, the court noted the James' case and distinguished it by saying "the 'thing
marked' in the instant case is the pharmaceutical substance in pellet form within cap-
sules and the 'mark' is the colour applied to one half of the capsule and the various
colours applied to the individual pellets within the capsule." Id. at 920, [1975] 2 All
E.R. at 581, 584. Based on the great recognition the capsules had achieved in the
industry, the court held that the definition of "trade mark" in § 68(1) of the Trade
Marks Act of 1938 did not exclude a mark that covered the whole surface of the good
to which it applied. Id. at 918, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 585. The court also held that a
mark did not have to be two-dimensional when intended to contain the goods for which
it was registered. Id. No mention of the Sobrefina case appeared anywhere in the
pharmaceuticals decision. The court assumed that the capsule surrounding the pellets
was "applied to" them but was not necessary to their consumption. The opinion failed
to mention how the "pellets" could have been consumed without being contained in
some form of capsule.
" It was described by the Registrar as "a container in the shape of a bottle with
a cap, the whole being made of plastics material, and having the lower portion enclosed
in a cardboard cylindrical sleeve." Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. at 674. The company apply-
ing for the registration had, instead of (as was customary) drawing a picture of the
bottle in the blank space on the registration form, actually taped an empty bottle in the
space, and described the mark it sought protected as consisting of "the shape or form of
the accompanying representation, when applied to a container." Id.
19 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 68(1).
150 Id.
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representation of the mark, and references therein to the use
of a mark in relation to goods shall be construed as refer-
ences to the use thereof upon, or in physical or other relation
to, goods. 51
While observing that the definition of "mark" did not define an exclu-
sive list of what constituted such a thing,'52 the Registrar asserted that
the items listed in the definition were "all in the nature of visual sym-
bols capable of being applied to goods or used in relation to goods and
not either forming an essential part or, as in this instance, an essential
physical concomitant of the goods."' 53 Containers were necessary to
consume beverages away from their place of sale; therefore, the Regis-
trar reasoned:
a container is a prerequisite to such sale and must . . . be
regarded as an essential . . concomitant of the goods.
The references in section 68 of the Act to the use of a
mark in relation to goods imply, to my mind, that a mark is
something separate and distinct from the goods and not a
physical object which forms either an essential part of the
article itself, or its packaging . . .
As an additional reason for rejecting the application, the Registrar cited
the fact that a committee examining "the Law and Practice relating to
Trade Marks"' 5 5 had explicitly considered the addition of containers to
the definition of "marks" and rejected the idea, fearing that monopolies
might "interfere with the right of the public to use a design of which
the period [provided by patent] protection had expire[d]."' 58
On appeal, Judge Whitford of the Chancery Division felt "the
shape [was] the container . . . . ,5 The court held upon dismissal that
a device is not appropriate for registration unless it can be represented
in two dimensions, because only then could it be known exactly what
shape was being asserted as distinctive.' 58 The court also noted that,
161 Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. at 674 (quoting the Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68(2)).
'5 Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. at 675. Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68 is a definitional
section for terms used in the Act. The section defines all the terms as having fixed
meanings, except for the term "mark." "Mark" is defined as including certain items.
An interpretation that examined the possibility of including other items within the defi-
nition of "mark" is not unrealistic or without a reasonable basis. See infra text accom-
panying notes 224-26.
13 Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. at 675.
154 Id.
155 This committee was the "Goschen Committee." Id.
15 Id. at 676.
157 Id. at 679.
153 Id.
[Vol. 10:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/5
PRODUCT CONFIGURATION PROTECTION
while the special committee 59 had rejected the addition of the word
"container" to the definition of "mark," they never actually dealt with
whether wrappers or containers were already within the purview of the
existing definition.'0
Analysis of the reasoning used in the Sobrefina case as well as in
the other two cases cited in the Coke opinion"'1 reveals that similar
fundamental doctrines that govern United States trademark law are
present and are applied in much the same way as in British trademark
cases. That functional aspects of a product cannot be protected is clear
from the opinions in In re James' Trade Mark 62 and Smith Kline &
French v. Sterling Winthrop Group Ltd. 6 ' The statute itself requires
some form of distinctiveness.'" Further, the statute also allows proof of
distinctiveness in a way similar to proof of secondary meaning,'6 5 since
it allows the Registrar to consider whether the trademark has acquired
distinctiveness "by reason of the use of the trademark."' 6 Lastly, the
United States doctrine that trademarks will only be protected when
used on goods for which they are registered 6 ' corresponds to the Brit-
ish statute, which requires trademarks to be registered "in respect of
particular goods.'1
68
4. THE Coke DECISION
In its terse three-page decision disposing of Coke's application,' 69
159 See supra note 155.
16o Sobrefina, 1974 R.P.C. at 681.
161 See supra note 147.
62 33 Ch. D. 392, 394 (C.A. 1886), 1886 R.P.C. 340 (C.A.) ("The Appellants
cannot claim any monopoly in the shape in which they sell their black lead .... ).
16" [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578 (H.L.); see also Sobrefina, 1974
R.P.C. at 675 ("Registration [of the bottle] as a trade mark would in effect be a means
of extending indefinitely protection for a design which Parliament had intended should
be of limited duration.").
164 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 9.
.65 See supra text accompanying notes 56-73.
166 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 9(3); see also British Petroleum Co. v. Euro-
pean Petroleum Distribs., [1968] R.P.C. 54 (Oh.) (where the unregistered term "B.P."
was granted protection based on its wide recognition by consumers as well as its related
use to several registered marks incorporating term within them.)
167 See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
168 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 3.
169 Coke's initial application was to the Registrar of Trade Marks. Coca-Cola
Trade Marks (Q.B. Ch. Div., Dec. 14, 1983) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
The application defined the mark as consisting of
the distinctive shape and appearance applied to a bottle when used as a
container for the goods and as shown in the accompanying registration,
characterized by vertical flutes or ribs throughout the surface of the bottle
and interrupted by a smooth middle panel dividing the upper and lower
fluted areas, the whole being contained within a configuration comprising
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an upper section to which a cap or closure may be affixed; a neck; a rela-
tively broad central portion; a waist; and a base having a tapering effect.
Id. at LEXIS, p. 1.
The hearing officer rejected the application on April 29, 1983, for two reasons. Id.
at LEXIS, p. 2. First, since the mark applied for was a bottle, it could not be a mark
(and therefore a trademark) within § 68(1) of the Trade Marks Act of 1938. Id. The
hearing officer stated the practice of the Trade Marks Registry for over 100 years had
been to reject container shapes for registration. Id. He also stated that two committees
examining British trademark law, the Goschen Committee in 1934 and the Mathys
Committee in 1974, had recommended that shapes of containers should not be registra-
ble as trademarks. Id.
The hearing officer also felt the bottle was not distinctive enough to receive protec-
tion, as required by § 9 of the Trade Marks Act of 1938. Id.
The trial judge had adopted the definition of "mark" stated in Murray's Oxford
English Dictionary, which defined it as "a sign affixed or impressed for distinction. A
device, stamp, seal, brand, inscription, written character, or the like, placed upon an
article .... " Id. at LEXIS, p. 3. He added to this the remark from § 68(2) of the
Trade Marks Act referring to marks as "printed or other visual representation[s]," and
analyzed Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Sterling-Winthrop Group, Ltd.
[1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578 (H.L.) using this conception of "mark."
He asserted that the marks sought to be registered in that case were the pellets them-
selves, surrounded by capsules, and that this combination was not a container. Id. at
LEXIS, p. 4. The trial judge finally distinguished the case, saying it was concerned
with "whether a combination of colored coatings applied to the whole visible surface of
the goods, and, therefore, necessarily applied three-dimensionally, was a registrable
trade mark under section 68." Id. at LEXIS, p. 5.
The judge then examined In re James' Trade Mark, and stated that it had not
been disapproved in Smith Kline:
[I]t has always been regarded as correctly stating the law as to the
non-registrability of the shape of the actual particular goods as a trade
mark for those goods. If. . . the shape of goods cannot be a mark for the
purposes of registration as a trade mark so as to give a monopoly in the
shape of the product - the "goods" in question - it seems to me that
equally the shape of a container or package for the product cannot be a
mark for the purposes of registration under the Act. I can see no logical
distinction in this respect between the shape of the goods and the shape of
the containers or packages in which the goods are contained.
Id. at LEXIS, p. 7.
The judge went on to state that it was reasonable to assume that Parliament knew
containers were not registrable when it drafted the Trade Marks Act in 1938 and, since
it did not amend the Act to include containers in the definition of "mark," it must have
decided against allowing protection for containers. Id. at LEXIS, p. 8.
. Since the judge found the bottle could not be a mark, he found it unnecessary to
examine the Registrar's assertion that the bottle was not distinctive. Id. at LEXIS, p. 9.
The next appeal was to the Court of Appeal. Re Coca-Cola Co.'s Trade Marks
Application, 1985 F.S.R. 315, 1986 R.P.C. 421 (C.A. 1985). The Court of Appeal (per
Lawton, L.J.) also found the main issue to be whether a bottle - admittedly of an
unusual shape - could be a mark under § 68. Id. at 318, 1986 R.P.C. at __ .
After citing the definition of "mark," the opinion stated, "[t]he starting point in this
appeal must be the construction of the word 'mark' . . . . It is a word in ordinary use;
it is not a word of art and its construction is not limited by the words which follow it in
the statutory definition." Id. at 319, 1986 R.P.C. at __ . The court adopted the
same definition of "mark" the trial court did, and reasoned "[i]t follows that in this
case the relevant question is: can the applicants' bottle be said to have been 'applied' to
the goods . . . . As a matter of the ordinary usage of the English language, in my
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the House of Lords cited only the James' lead-block case170 and the
Smith Kline pellet-capsule case.' The Coke application was viewed
antagonistically from the start, as Lord Templeman opened by saying,
"[tihis is another attempt to expand on the boundaries of intellectual
property and to convert a protective law into a source of monopoly."1
72
He then, however, appeared to undermine his opening by remarking,
"[s]ince the early 1920s . . . [Coke] has sold in the United Kingdom a
...beverage under the name 'Coca-Cola' contained in bottles of a
judgment, the answer is 'no'." Id.
After distinguishing Smith Kline, the court reiterated the quote from James': "a
mark is something distinct from the thing itself." Id. at 320, 1986 R.P.C. at _
The next opinion in the Court of Appeal was that of Sir Denys Buckley. He
agreed with the first opinion that a "concept" such as the shape of a bottle was not
within the definition of the word "mark," but conceded that the shape of a bottle or
container could be protected under the law of passing-off if the item had achieved the
requisite distinctiveness. Id. at 322, 1986 R.P.C. at __ .
The opinion then focused on the two committees that examined the issue (the
Goschen Committee in 1934 and the Mathys Committee in 1974), since "[a]part from
the Sobrefina case ...there [appeared] to be no reported decision touching on [the
issue of protecting containers]." Id. at 323, 1986 R.P.C. at __ . Further, Sir De-
nys admitted,
[t]here is no material available ...to indicate whether past refusals to
register the shapes of containers as trade marks have been the result of the
interpretation of the word "mark" as not extending to features of that
kind or to the exercise by registers of their discretion under what is now
section 17(2) of the Trade Marks Act 1938.
Id. at 324, 1986 R.P.C. at _
In spite of the strong reasoning found in the Sobrefina case, Sir Denys found that
since the Chancery Court phrased its support for the refusal of the registration as being
a matter of "discretion," see Sobrefina S.A.'s Trade Mark Application, 1974 R.P.C. at
672, 682 (Q.B. Ch. Div.) "[tihe judgment ...did not decide that the shape of a
container could in no circumstances be subject matter for registration as a trade mark
. " Re Coke's Trade Marks Application, 1985 F.S.R. at 324, 1986 R.P.C. at
In the second-to-last paragraph of his opinion, Sir Denys faces the issue squarely
for the first time, by recognizing that "[a] liquid can have no stable shape." Id. at 326,
1986 R.P.C. at __ . However, instead of proceeding with this analysis and exam-
ining the possibility that there is no way to apply a mark to a liquid good, he retreats
and takes refuge in the analysis used by the judge in the Sobrefina case and finds that
since a liquid good must be held in a container, the container "is an integral part of the
goods dealt in." Id. His analysis ends with the statement "[i]f a brewer wishes to use a
trade mark in relation to his beer, the 'thing to be marked' must be the containers ...
in which he sells the beer. The mark must be something distinct from the containers,
even if the containers be made in fancy shapes." Id. The next appeal was to the House
of the Lords.
170 James', 33 Ch. D. 392 (C.A. 1886), 1886 R.P.C. 340 (C.A.).
171 Smith Kline, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578 (H.L.). Why the
House of Lords failed in the Coke case to mention the only existing case on point,
Sobrefina, is unclear. That case is used by both the trial court and the appeal court in
their opinions. See supra note 169.
17' Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695, 697, [1986] 2 All E.R.
274, 275 (H.L.).
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distinctive shape."' 78 Thus influenced, Lord Templeman "assume[d],
without deciding," that the bottle was distinctive.17
Continuing in its antagonistic view, the court stated:
It is not sufficient for the . . . bottle to be distinctive.
[Coke] must succeed in the startling proposition that the bot-
tle is a trade mark. If so, then any other container or any
article of a distinctive shape is capable of being a trade mark.
This raises the spectre of a total and perpetual monopoly in
containers . . . A rival manufacturer must be free to sell
any container or article of similar shape provided [it] is la-
belled or packaged in a manner which avoids confusion
175
Consistent with dicta from the 1886James' lead-block case,176 the court
stated what appears to be the key element of its holding: "[a] bottle is a
container not a mark. 1 7 7 Continuing to cite the same case, the court
repeated the dicta from 1886: "[a] mark must be something distinct
from the thing being marked . . . .There is no monopoly in the
shape."17
In the closing paragraph, the court distinguished the Smith Kline
pellet-capsule case, 179 asserting that the case related only to the color
applied to goods and had no application to goods themselves or contain-
ers for goods.'80
5. ANALYSIS
The brief survey above of the protection given liquid good contain-
ers in the United Kingdom. 1 and the United States"8 2 reveals diametri-
cally opposed views."" While United States law is willing to grant pro-
171 Id. (emphasis added).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 698, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 276.
1'8 In re James' Trade Mark Application, 33 Ch. D. 392 (C.A. 1886), 1886
R.P.C. 340 (C.A.).
177 Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 698, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 276.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 699, [1986] 2 All E.R. at ; see Smith Kline & French Laboratories
Ltd., v. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578
(H.L.). For a discussion of the Smith Kline holding, see supra note 147.
180 Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 699, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 277.
.81 See supra text accompanying notes 143-80.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 82-117.
183 Compare In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566,
567-68 (T.T.A.B. 1977) ("[W]hile a configuration or shape of a container is not regis-
trable for the container, per se, it may be registrable for the particular contents thereof
if the shape is nonfunctional in character and is, moreover, inherently distinctive or has
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tection where there is sufficient consumer recognition... of a
container, 185 the United Kingdom refuses to do so. 8  More specifically,
the United States has granted protection to Coke for the shape and
design of its distinctive bottle while the United Kingdom has not. An
analysis of the House of Lords decision reveals very little solid reason-
ing for this stubbornness on the part of the British legal system. The
House of Lords should have allowed Coke's appeal.
The British courts' difficulty with allowing protection of trade-
marks stems from their unfounded fear that granting protection might
lead to perpetual monopolies over the shape of some containers,' 87 and
to the eventual restriction of new liquid goods entering the market. 88
This fear seems unfounded given the United States experience.
The fundamental goals and standards of American trademark law
are almost identical to those of British trademark law. 89 United States
trademark law, however, has found a way to grant trademark protec-
tion to containers for liquid goods 9° without eliminating competition in
particular industries, such as the soft-drink industry. No "monopoliza-
tion" of container shapes seems to have occured, as evidenced by the
large number of soft-drinks consumers can choose from today.191
Many of these soft-drinks are contained in standard metal cans
and generically-shaped one- and two-liter plastic bottles, identified by
colors, words and symbols.' 92 Trademark law performs the important
acquired a secondary meaning .... ") with Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1
W.L.R. 695, 698, [1986] 2 All E.R. 274, 276 ("A bottle is a container not a mark.").
184 Known in trademark terminology as "secondary meaning." See supra text ac-
companying notes 56-73.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 74-80; see also Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981) ("One of the essential elements of the
law of trademarks . . . [is] the principle that no legal protection [is] available for prod-
ucts or features that [are] functional.").
186 See, e.g., Coke, [1986], 1 W.L.R. at 697, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 276 ("Coca-Cola
contained in bottles of a distinctive shape.").
817 Id. at 697-98, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 276.
188 Id. ("If. . .[the bottle is a trademark], then any other container. . . is capa-
ble of being a trade mark. This raises the spectre of a total and perpetual monopoly in
containers . . ").
189 See supra text accompanying notes 125-27, 138-42 & 161-68.
190 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Reg. No. 696,147
(Approved Aug. 12, 1960) (allowing Coke to trademark in America the identical bottle
for which trademark protection was denied in Britain).
181 A short list of the soft-drinks available in the United States today would in-
clude Coke, Pepsi, RC Cola, Sprite, 7-Up, Hires Root Beer, Dr. Pepper, Slice, Crush
(Orange, Cherry, Grape), Sunkist, TAB, Canfield's Diet Chocolate Fudge, Yoo-Hoo
Beverages, as well as the large number of generic brands offered by smaller merchants
within the regional markets they serve.
1, Both Coke and Pepsi can be purchased in standard 16-ounce bottles. Such
soft-drinks as Hires Root Beer, 7-Up, Sprite, Teem and Dr. Pepper can be purchased
in generically shaped 12-ounce bottles. Almost any brand of soft-drink can today be
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function of distinguishing soft-drinks from each other by granting pro-
tection based on the way the containers are decorated, still requiring
that they meet the standards imposed by both statutory and common
law.193 Since liquid goods (such as soft-drinks) that attempt to identify
themselves by the shape of their container rather than (or in addition
to) the use of other means are required to meet the same standards,""
United States trademark law grants protection to these containers as
well. The doctrine of functionality ensures that containers designed for
functional reasons will not be removed from use by competitors by act-
ing as the initial hurdle in most examinations.195 The requirement of
distinctiveness serves to prohibit confusion in the marketplace by grant-
ing protection to only truly unique configurations.19 6 After the product
and its container have been in use for a while, the "particularity of
use" doctrine 9" ensures that containers granted protection remain
available for use on unrelated products in other industries.
Thus, the risk that "monopolies" on container shapes will form
because of trademark registration is marginal. This is true not only
because strict standards are imposed in order to receive trademark pro-
tection, but also because many liquid goods are differentiated by the
trade dress of their container, as opposed to the shape.
British trademark law is equally able to prevent the "monopoliza-
tion" of containers since it employs the same standards in granting pro-
tection as United States trademark law. 9 However, British law denies
protection to containers based upon the principle that a "bottle is a
container not a mark." '99 This policy contradicts the purposes of trade-
mark law. The interest of the entrepreneur, Coke, is harmed because
other merchants of similar goods, such as Pepsi, are now free to market
their goods in similar containers. Thus, the entrepreneur's market
share is likely to decrease due to circumstances not calculated at the
time the entrepreneur entered the market. In the long run, the effect is
purchased in standard metal cans and/or one and two-liter plastic bottles.
193 The terms Coke, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Pepsi-Cola, Sprite, Hires, and Sunkist are
some of the examples of soft-drink names granted trademark protection by registration.
19 See In re Days-Ease Home Prods. Corp., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 567
(T.T.A.B. 1977).
'5 See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir.
1980) (metal container for crackers denied protection based on functionality of design);
see also supra text accompanying notes 74-81.
I" See, e.g., Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539, 542
(C.C.P.A. 1967) (protection denied container for popular wine based on finding of lack
of distinctiveness).
197 See generally supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
199 Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 695, [1986] 2 All E.R. 274,
276 (H.L.).
[Vol. 10:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss1/5
PRODUCT CONFIGURATION PROTECTION
to reduce the entrepreneur's incentive to enter the market with new
designs, since other merchants have a greater chance of appropriating
his success. In turn, consumers will be more confused when choosing
among products.2"0
Denying protection to deserving containers leaves the entrepreneur
in the United Kingdom with the alternative of defending his product
with a passing-off suit. This remedy is insufficient for several reasons.
First, registration is likely to cost much less than pursuing the possibly
large number of passing-off suits. Second, registration is more definite
and final. Once the configuration is registered it never has to be regis-
tered again. Third, the presumption of "exclusive use" available to the
owner of a registered configuration is not available to the plaintiff en-
trepreneur bringing a series of passing-off suits. In each separate case,
the entrepreneur must prove that the configuration has achieved the
necessary statutory distinction with regard to the allegedly infringing
configuration. 01 Fourth, registration provides the owner with a tangi-
ble, salable asset202 of greater value than the uncertainty of winning a
number of passing-off suits. Denying trademark protection to
merchants of liquid goods in distinctive containers, therefore, removes
the only viable mode of protection available to protect their product.
In its opinion, the House of Lords relied solely on the reasoning
used by the three tribunals that had previously examined the case.
First, the definition of "trademark" required the object under consider-
ation be a "mark."' 03 Second, "mark" was defined in a way that did
not explicitly include containers or their shapes.'s " Third, In re James'
Trade Mark (the lead-block case) mandated the result that "[t]here is
no monopoly in the shape."' 5
One part of the first conclusion is technically indisputable. The
definition of "trademark" clearly states that something must first be a
"mark" before it can be a trademark. 0 6 The rest of the definition,
200 The effect on competing merchants is unclear. While initially they are likely to
gain a portion of the market by profiting from the original entrepreneur's goodwill,
they too will lose market share to other merchants desirous of sharing in the success.
Whether this action will increase the overall market for the good (by causing more shelf
space to be devoted to it) or decrease it (by causing consumers to purchase less confus-
ing products) cannot be predicted. The fact that the result is unpredictable, however,
means there is uncertainty in the introduction of new products. This uncertainty alone
may keep other merchants from entering, since uncertainty increases the risk of any
venture.
'0' For a discussion of the British tort of passing off, see supra note 122.
22 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 24.
... Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 698, 2 All E.R. at 276.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68.
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however, mandates only that the mark be "used or proposed to be used
in relation to goods for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a
connection in the course of trade between the goods and some person
having the right either as proprietor or as registered user to use the
mark .... ,,207 Applying each part of the definition to Coke's situation
reveals a strong probability that Coke's bottle is exactly the type of item
that the statute was created to protect. The bottle had been used (1)
"[s]ince the early 1920's''208 (2) solely in relation to Coke's product. 9
(3) to indicate a connection between Coke (the company) and Coke (the
beverage),210 and (4) by Coke as a proprietor.
The only potential issue is whether Coke had the "right" 211 to use
the bottle as a proprietor.2 12 While the statute does not define "proprie-
tor, '213 the general rule is that the person who first designs or uses a
trademark is entitled to claim ownership.21 Alternatively, a literal
reading of the definition would seem to indicate that the "right" comes
from a combination of intent to use the mark as one's own and actual
use of the mark.21 5 Coke would clearly be the proprietor under either
of these two tests: Coke was the first to design and use the bottle, with
a clear intent to distinguish its product from others. Since the House of
Lords refused to read the entire definition, however, it never reached
the level of analysis necessary to examine this issue.
The second conclusion relates to the definition of "mark" and is
much more open to dispute. The definition "includes a device, brand,
heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, or any
combination thereof .... ,",1 This list is not meant to be exclusive.21
Further, as Lord Judge Lawton admitted in the Court of Appeal deci-
sion,218 there is no authority at all stating whether past refusals to reg-
207 Id.
208 Coke, [1986] 1 W.L.R. at 697, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 275.
209 Id.
210 This is inherent in the finding of the House of Lords' opinion that the bottle
was distinctive. Id. Something is distinctive when it is adapted "to distinguish goods
with which the proprietor. . . is or may be connected in the course of trade from goods
in the case of which no such connection subsists . . . ." Trade Marks Act, 1938, §
9(2). It is also inherent in the House of Lords' finding that the design of the bottle was
registered as a design mark until 1940, when the registration expired. Coke, [1986] 1
W.L.R. at 697, [1986] 2 All E.R. at 275.
211 Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68 requires "some person" to have "the right" to
use the mark as either a proprietor or a registered user.
212 See supra note 131.
213 Id.
214 Re Application of Vitamins, Ltd., [1955] 3 All E.R. 827.
215 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, § 68(1).
216 Id.
217 Sobrefina S.A.'s Trade Mark Application, 1974 R.P.C. 672 (Q.B. Ch. Div.).
218 Re Coca-Cola Co.'s Trade Marks Application, 1985 F.S.R. 315, 1986 R.P.C.
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ister containers were predicated on an interpretation of the word
"mark" that excluded container shape.219 First, the House of Lords
insisted on assuming that the term "mark" was used "only to describe
something which distinguishes goods rather than the goods themselves.
A bottle is a container not a mark."22 This error in reasoning is fatal
for three reasons. The House of Lords never even discussed the issue of
whether a bottle is a "device" and thus included within the definition of
"mark." The House of Lords' dismissal of the issue, bluntly stating
"[t]he distinction between a mark and the thing which is marked is
supported by authority," '221 misses the point that the "thing marked" is
the soft-drink within the bottle, not the bottle, just as the "thing
marked" in the pellet-capsule case222 was the "pharmaceutical sub-
stance [] . . . in pellet form . ...
Second, even if a bottle is not a "device," all terms defined in the
"Interpretation" section of the Act 224 are defined as meaning certain
things except "mark," which is defined as including certain things. 25
While the reason for this is not stated in the statute, Parliament appar-
ently intended to leave the definition open for the possible addition of
future terms. 22 Thus, an interpretation of the statute allowing for a
liberal construction of "mark" appears both reasonable and realistic.
Third, there is no way any of the items listed in the definition of
"mark" can be applied to a liquid good. With the exception of frozen
liquid goods produced from a mold with the merchant's trademark im-
printed into the mold, such items are useless in relation to liquid goods.
The two ways by which a company may distinguish its goods are to
either package them in a distinctively shaped container or package them
in a container distinctively decorated. No purpose of the trademark law
is furthered by denying the former alternative merely because the latter
is also available. Where only two methods of distinguishing a particular
good are available, denying the use of one of them unnecessarily limits
the ways in which a good may be identified and distinguished. This
makes the product more difficult to market, and, therefore, less likely to
be sold. The end result is contrary to the interests of all parties in-
421 (C.A. 1985).
219 Id. at 324, 1986 R.P.C. at
220 Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695, 698, [19861 2 All E.R.
274, 276 (H.L.).
221 Id.
222 Smith Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Sterling-Winthrop Group Ltd.,
[19751 1 W.L.R. 914, [1975] 2 All E.R. 578 (H.L.).
223 Id. at 916, [1975] 2 All E.R. at 579.
224 See Trade Marks Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 22, § 68.
225 Id.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
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volved. Merchants of all types suffer because they have one less way to
distinguish their goods. Consumers suffer from less competition and less
variety in the marketplace. The Patent and Trademark Office and sev-
eral courts in the United States have implicitly recognized this by
granting protection in several instances.227 The British refusal to do so
by unnecessarily insisting "a bottle is a container not a mark" is anach-
ronistic in an age when numerous products compete for consumer at-
tention with sophisticated marketing techniques.228
The House of Lords lastly relied on the James' case mandate that
there can be no monopoly in shape, and that a mark must be something
distinct and different from the thing marked.229 This case does not sup-
port the Coke decision for two reasons. First, the decision in James'
related to the shape of goods, not containers.2"' The court was con-
cerned with a monopoly on the shape - an d thus the function - of
goods.2"' The shape of goods themselves is far more determinative of
how they can be used than is the shape of their container.232 Such an
argument when applied to liquid goods focuses attention on the wrong
issue, since the item consumers desire to purchase is the soft-drink in-
side - which cannot have its own shape - not the bottle. As such, the
concern with monopolies over shape in James' cannot be easily analo-
gized to containers for liquids.
Second, since the case related to solid goods, the trademark there
could be applied directly to the goods. This is not possible with liquid
goods. The only way to impart a particular shape to liquid goods is
through the use of a specially shaped container. Just as the lead block
was stamped with its distinctive trademark in James', so the liquid is
"stamped" with its distinctively shaped container.
6. CONCLUSION
Trademarks make "effective competition possible in a complex,
impersonal marketplace by providing a means through which. . . con-
sumer[s] can identify products which please [them] and reward the pro-
227 See, e.g., supra note 9.
228 See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
229 See Application of Coca-Cola Co., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 695, 698, [1986] 2 All
E.R. at 274, 276 (H.L.).
220 See In re James' Trade Mark Application, 33 Ch. D. 392 (C.A. 1886), 1886
R.P.C. 340 (C.A.).
231 Id. at 394-95, 1886 R.P.C. at 343.
232 For example, Coke can be consumed almost regardless of the shape of the
container it comes in. In contrast, the ability of a satellite dish to receive and focus
radio waves is directly dependent on the shape of the disk.
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ducer with continued patronage." 2 3 Unfounded reluctance to grant
protection to distinctively shaped containers simply because they are
containers is a semantic attempt to dodge the reality that liquid goods
are not solid enough to receive trademarks in the way non-liquid goods
are.
Trademark protection should be granted on the basis of uniform,
sound principles that further the public interest in confusion-free com-
petition. With a product marketable in so few ways, trademark law
should be used to protect the only available methods, not eliminate
them.
233 Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
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